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HELEN D. LAMOREAUX, THE SECOND 
INJURY FUND, and THE UTAH 
STATE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, 
Respondents. 
30URT OF APPEALS 
Case No. 870344-CA 
Category 6 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONERS VARIANT 
AND/OR EMPLOYERS MUTUAL LIABILITY 
- EIMAC, INC. 
INSURANCE 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In its Order Granting Motion for Review, the 
Industrial Commission erroneously interpreted and failed to 
apply the standard of legal causation sfet forth in Allen v. 
Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986) for cases 
involving workers with a pre-existing condition aggravated 
by an industrial injury. In Allen, the 
clearly stated that before benefits can 
in such instances, he ". . . must show t|:hat the employment 
contributed something substantial to increase the risk he 
already faced in everyday life because of his condition. This 
Utah Supreme Court 
be awarded to a worker 
additional element of risk in the workplace is usually 
supplied by an exertion greater than that undertaken in normal, 
everyday life." Id. at 25. In the instant case, respondent 
Lamoreaux was indisputedly suffering from a pre-existing back 
condition at the time of her back injury at issue. 
Furthermore, the evidence revealed that the event precipitating 
her injury was the lifting, from waist level, of an 18 
1/2-pound x-ray tube. This activity does not constitute "an 
exertion greater than that undertaken in normal everyday 
life." Thus, under the law set forth in Allen, Ms. Lamoreaux 
is clearly not entitled to worker's compensation benefits for 
the injury she suffered on November 15, 1985. The Commission's 
award of benefits should, therefore, be reversed, and the 
decision of the Administrative Law Judge should be reinstated. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S ORDER IS UNSUPPORTED 
BY EITHER LEGAL PRECEDENCE OR FACTUAL EVIDENCE. 
Utah Code Annotated § 35-1-84 (1953 as amended) 
provides that upon review of a Commission order, the Court may 
set aside the award if the Commission acted "without or in 
excess of its powers" or if "the findings of fact do not 
support the award." In the instant case, the Commission acted 
contrary to law and thus, outside the scope of its powers. 
Additionally, its decision is not supported by the evidence. 
Therefore, its Order should be reversed and the Findings and 
Order of the Administrative Law Judge reinstated. 
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A. The Commission was Acting Outside the Scope of Its 
Jurisdiction in Formulating a New Standard of 
Legal Causation for Cases Involving Allegedly 
Job-Induced Preexisting Conditions. 
The Commission's Order purports to award benefits to 
Ms. Lamoreaux on the grounds her preexisting back problem was 
solely the result of her employment activities with Varian -
Eimac. According to the Commission, an applicant with such a 
preexisting condition is not bound by the higher standard 
of legal causation despite the clarity of that requirement, as 
set forth in Allen, for cases involving aggravated 
preexisting conditions. The Order of the Commission in this 
regard directly contravenes the standard of compensability 
adopted by the Utah Supreme Court since the Court in Allen 
made no distinction between job-induced preexisting conditions 
by the same employer and preexisting conditions attributable to 
non-employment life or to the working qonditions of a different 
employer. 
The level of legal causation to be applied in any 
given case is clearly a question of lawl 
Court stated in Cudahay Packing Company 
As the Utah Supreme 
of Nebraska v. 
Brown, 210 P. 608, 610 (Utah 1922), "[thhe legal effect of the 
evidence produced is a question of law which is the duty of 
this Court to decide." The rule that no deference should be 
given to Commission findings on questions of law was once again 
reaffirmed by the Court in Utah Consolidated Mining Company v. 
Industrial Commission of Utah, 240 P. 4^0, 442 (Utah 1925) 
where it stated: 
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No doubt the Commission may misapply some 
provision of the statute or positive law in 
making or denying an award. If the 
Commission does so and makes an award for 
compensation which is contrary to law, it 
does what is not sanctioned by the law 
under which it acts, and hence, as it is 
expressed in the statute, it acts in excess 
of its jurisdiction. 
Although both Cudahay and Utah Consolidated Mining were 
decided under prior law, the statute providing for review of 
Commission decisions was the same as the statute applicable 
herein. Inasmuch as Allen clearly states the positive law 
governing the compensability of Industrial Commission claims, 
the Commission's blatant disregard of the standard established 
by the Utah Supreme Court in favor of fashioning a standard of 
its own clearly violates the scope of its authority and 
warrants reversal by this Court. 
B. There is no Evidence in the Record to Support 
Ms. Lamoreaux's Claim that Her Preexisting 
Back Condition is Due Solely to Her Work 
Activities at Varian - Eimac. 
In the medical panel report, Dr. Girard Vanderhooft, 
the medical panel physician, states: 
I do believe that there was a 
pre-existing weakness of the~"ligaments 
which would make intervertebral disc 
herniation more likelyT This was 
evidenced by the fact that she [Ms. 
Lamoreaux] had sought chiropractic 
treatments in April and August prior to her 
injury in November. 
. . . Considering all factors, however, I 
believe that a 15 percent permanent partial 
impairment of the whole person is the 
appropriate impairment rating in this state 
-4-
and at this time. I think that the 
permanent impairment would justly be 
divided equally between the pre-existing 
condition and the injury of November 15, 
1985. That is, 7 1/2 percent whole person 
impairment due to the pre-existing 
condition and 7 1/2 percent is due to the 
injury of November 15, 1985. I . . . 
(Emphasis added.) 
(R. at 249.) Ms. Lamoreaux does not contest the above 
finding by the medical panel doctor of 
in her back rendering her more suscepti 
preexisting condition 
>le to injury at the 
15, 1985. Rather, she time of her disc herniation on November 
claims that the preexisting condition identified by Dr. 
Vanderhooft was wholly job-induced by her employment duties at 
Varian. Her claim to this effect is based largely on the fact 
that she had not experienced any symptomatic back problems 
prior to her employment with the appellant. Case law is clear, 
however, that a preexisting condition need not be known to the 
applicant in order to be considered preexisting for purposes of 
Allen. For example, in Justice Zimmerman's concurring 
opinion in Holloway v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 729 
P.2d 31 (Utah 1986), he states: 
. . . I would observe that th^ preexisting 
condition of which Allen speaks need not 
be patent; in fact, it need nqt have been 
known or knowable to anyone bdfore the 
injury. The sole question is (whether the 
worker came to the workplace with a 
condition that increased his risk of 
injury. If he did and that condition 
contributed to the injury, then Allen's 
higher standard of legal casuation comes 
into play so as to place that Worker on the 
same footing as one who did not come to 
work with a preexisting condition. 
(Emphasis added.) 
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Id. at 32. Thus, a quiescent preexisting problem brought to 
light by an industrial injury is sufficient to invoke the 
higher standard of legal causation mandated by Allen for 
purposes of determining compensability. 
Although Ms. Lamoreaux and the Industrial Commission 
claim that her preexisting condition is attributable solely to 
her employment with Varian, the evidence is to the contrary. 
At the time of her injury, Ms. Lamoreaux weighed approximately 
190 pounds and had been at at least this weight for a number of 
years. (R. at 73.) She was also suffering from preexisting 
arthritis in her back. This fact is evidenced by the office 
notes of Dr. Wayne Zundell who, on April 22, 1985, made the 
following entry: 
Lifting at work and at home and injured her 
back four days ago. 
Arthritis - was much improved until she 
lifted tube at work and irritated back. 
Next morning, bent over to pick up a child 
and sudden onset of severe, non-radiating 
low back pain. Better today, but still 
disabling. 
(R. at 143.) 
Furthermore, the notes of Dr. Thomas Bowman dated 
December 9, 1985 indicate that Ms. Lamoreaux had had a previous 
history of back problems dating back "over a couple of years". 
(R. at 96). Even the Employer's First Report of Injury signed 
by Ms. Lamoreaux indicates that she had had ongoing problems 
with her back for some time and had been seeing a 
chiropractor. (R. at 186.) In fact, the applicant testified 
that she had experienced some rather severe low back pain in 
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both April and August of 1985. In April, her back pain was 
severe enough to lead her to seek the assistance of Dr. Sharp, 
a chiropractor, and in August it led her to seek the assistance 
of both Dr. Sharp and Dr. Zundell, a medical doctor. (R. at 
28-30.) And finally, Mr. Rand Holding, a supervisor of Ms. 
Lamoreaux, testified that approximately a week to a week and a 
half prior to the time of her injury of November 15, 1985, Ms. 
Lamoreaux reported to him, upon arriving at work, that she had 
felt something pop in her back as she got out of her car that 
morning. (R. at 90, 93.) All of this evidence points to the 
existence of a back condition either predating Ms. Lamoreaux's 
employment with the employer or brought] about or aggravated by 
non-employment activities. In Jones v.| California Packing 
Corp., 244 P.2d 640, 644 (Ut. 1952), thb Utah Supreme Court 
stated that law does not invest the Commission with the 
"arbitrary power to disbelieve or disregard uncontradicted, 
competent, credible evidence." In the instant case, that is 
exactly what the Commission has done for there is no evidence 
to suggest Ms. Lamoreaux did not have a preexisting 
condition, nor is there evidence to support the Commission and 
the respondent's theory that any preexisting condition she did 
have was wholly induced by her work at yarian - Eimac. 
It should be noted at this point that in determining 
compensability, it is important to keep the issues of legal and 
medical causation separate and distinct! The fact that medical 
causation may be concretely established 
injury compensable unless the requisite 
does not render an 
legal causation is also 
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proven. Professor Larson, in his treatise on workmen's 
compensation, states: 
All too often these two tests [the legal 
test and the medical test] are scrambled 
together. When this happens, the effect is 
usually that one is lost sight of. Thus, 
obsession with the legal test of unusual 
exertion may lead to a holding that a very 
slight exertion, because it satisfies the 
legal test in being unusual for this 
employee, is adequate to support an award, 
although its ability medically to account 
for the collapse seems remote. Conversely, 
obsession with medical causation sometimes 
leads to a slighting of the need for 
precision in defining the legal rule, with 
the result that decisions may be based on 
statements by doctors that the exertion did 
or did not cause the heart attack, although 
neither the doctors nor the lawyers may 
have had a clear and consistent concept of 
what 'caused1 meant in this setting. 
Larson, Workmen's Compensation (Desk Ed.) § 38.83 (1987). 
In view of the evidence adduced in this case, it 
appears that the Commission's decision to award Ms. Lamoreaux 
benefits is based largely on the medical panel's finding that 
the lifting of 18 1/2 pounds can cause a disc herniation like 
that suffered by her. Standing alone, however, this finding is 
not sufficient to sustain an award for the issue of legal 
causation must still be addressed. In the instant case, the 
Administrative Law Judge correctly applied the higher standard 
of legal causation identified in Allen and found in favor of 
the defendant/employer. 
In view of the fact that there is no evidence to 
support Ms. Lamoreaux's claim that her preexisting condition 
was solely the result of work activities at Varian, and in view 
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of the uncontradicted medical evidence that respondent did have 
a preexisting back condition, it is clear that the unusual 
exertion standard should have been appl: 
compensability of her claim. The Commi|s 
acknowledge the evidence of record and 
legal standard in rendering its decisio|n is clearly arbitrary 
and capricious and should be reversed. 
ied in determining the 
ssion's failure to 
to apply the correct 
C. The Applicant's Work Activities) 
Do Not Constitute Unusual 
on November 15, 1985 
under Allen. Exertlion 
Respondent contends that evenl if the unusual exertion 
test is the proper test to be applied in the instant case, her 
activities on November 15, 1985 constitute unusual exertion due 
to their repetitious nature. As support for this position, 
she cites Kaiser Steel Corporation v. Monfredi, 631 
P.2d 888 (Utah 1981). Monfredi, however, was decided under 
prior law and the issue addressed by the Court was whether the 
applicant had sustained a "definite identifiable injury" or 
accident as that term was then defined. The issues of legal 
and medical causation were never discussed. In view of this 
fact, Monfredi is not controlling in the instant case. 
Varian does not contest respondents allegation 
that an injury which is the result of repetitive exertions may 
be compensable. However, Varian notes that claims for such 
injuries are still subject to the requirements of Allen. 
This fact is borne out by the Supreme Court's decision in 
Miera v. Industrial Commission, 728 P.2d 1023 (Utah 1986). 
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In Miera, the Administrative Law Judge denied the 
applicant's claim because the onset of his pain was gradual, 
not identified with a specific event and was related to his 
normal work activities. In reversing the agency's decision, 
the Supreme Court noted that Allen had "redefined the 
unexpected result of a work-related activity as a compensable 
accident if both medical and legal causation could be shown." 
Id. at 1024. It then went on to find that although Miera 
had a preexisting condition "his jumps into an eight-foot hole 
from a four-foot platform at thirty-minute intervals," 
constituted unusual exertion sufficient to meet the higher 
standard of legal causation required of workers with 
preexisting conditions. :[d. at 1024 1025. Since medical 
causation was also evident from the record, benefits were 
awarded. 
Although the Court, in Miera, found that jumping 
into an eight-foot hole at thirty-minute intervals meets the 
higher standard of legal causation under Allen, the lifting 
of 18 1/2 pounds from waist level is clearly not unusual 
exertion when compared to typical non-employment activity. 
Although in her brief, Ms. Lamoreaux describes the duties of 
her employment as lifting a Bl-90 x-ray tube from the floor, 
turning and carrying it and setting it down from 4 0 to 60 times 
a day, her testimony at the time of the hearing was much 
different. During cross-examination, Ms. Lamoreaux was 
questioned in detail about her work activities. She indicated 
that she had only been working on the Bl-90 part for 
-10-
approximately six months prior to the date of her injury. (R. 
at 55, 56.) She also testified that she was required to lift 
each part she worked on between six and ten times and that she 
worked on no more than six Bl-90's per day. (R. at 56.) Ms. 
Lamoreaux further stated that she worked at a workbench of just 
below chest height and that although she initially had to pick 
up the Bl-90s out of a tub on the floor near her work area, 
the other times she lifted the part it was from her workbench. 
(R. at 57.) And finally, she testified that once she had 
0, she would pick it up 
. at 57.) It is also 
Iwork on the Bl-90s 
lly one time per week, 
completed her work on a particular Bl-9|( 
and take it to some other location. (I^« 
significant that Ms. Lamoreaux did not 
every day and that the other parts on ^ hich she worked were 
smaller. (R. at 63.) In fact, according to her testimony, she 
worked on the Bl-90 on an average of onb 
depending on the order. (R. at 63.) 
In view of the above-cited testimony, appellants 
contend that the employment duties associated with Ms. 
Lamoreaux1s work on the Bl-90s do not cpnstitute unusual 
exertion as that term has been defined 
respondent worked on such parts only onk 
in Allen. The 
ice a week on the 
average. Furthermore, even when she did work on those parts, 
she had only to lift them one time each from the floor with the 
remainder of the work being performed from her workbench for 
the purpose of changing the position of the tube. There is no 
evidence that she was working in a confined or cramped area, 
and she was not working on an assembly line such that any of 
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the lifting done by her had to be made at a constant rate of 
speed. Under these circumstances, the Administrative Law Judge 
properly applied the legal causation test announced in Allen 
and denied benefits. 
II. THE COMMISSION HAD NO JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER 
RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR REVIEW AS THE 
MOTION WAS NOT TIMELY FILED. 
Unfortunately, appellants are not in a position to 
respond to many of the arguments raised by the respondent in 
support of her claim that the filing of her Motion for Review 
was timely. In its Order Granting Motion for Review, the 
Commission failed to make any factual findings or otherwise 
address the timeliness issue even though it was raised by 
appellants in their Response to Motion for Review. (R. at 
274.) The evidence presented by Ms. Lamoreaux in the form of 
Mr. Henriksen's Affidavit and the letter from Barbara 
Elicerio are not a part of the record and appellants are 
unable to address the allegations raised in them. Appellant's 
contention that Ms. Lamoreaux failed to timely file her 
Motion for Review is based upon the statutory time requirements 
for filing a Motion for Review and the date respondents Motion 
was stamped as having been filed with the Commission. 
In their original brief, appellants indicated that 
Ms. Lamoreaux1s. Motion for Review should have been filed on 
or before February 16, 1987. The applicant points out in her 
brief, however, that February 16th was President's Day and 
the Commission was not open, thus, her Motion for Review was 
-12-
7, a full six days after 
delivered to the 
not due until February 17th. This poirit is herewith 
conceded. Even so, appellants note that a copy of respondent's 
Motion was not date stamped as having been received in their 
counsel's office until February 23, 198 
the date the Motion was allegedly hand 
Commission and mailed to all opposing counsel. (See 
Addendum, Exhibit A.) Inasmuch as it is appellant's counsel's 
experience that documents mailed from ope Salt Lake City 
address to another are generally delivered within one to two 
days after mailing, the late receipt by 
Motion still leads them to question the 
respondent's filing. 
In her response to the timelijiess issue, Ms. 
Lamoreaux alleges that worker's compensation statutes are to 
be liberally construed. While appellants generally agree with 
this position, the rule of liberal construction was not 
intended to apply to the time requirements imposed on filings 
of jurisdictional magnitude. While thelconcept of what 
constitutes a filing may be liberally construed, the time 
them of respondent's 
timeliness of 
within which a filing is required to be 
necessity, be strictly enforced, for to 
such time limitations meaningless. 
made must, of 
do otherwise renders 
60(b) of the Utah Ms. Lamoreaux also cites Rule 
Rules of Civil Procedure and several cases interpreting that 
rule in support of her claim that the Commission should not be 
deprived of its jurisdiction to hear her motion due to her 
alleged late filing. Rule 60(b) provides for the setting aside 
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of a final judgment, order or proceeding on the basis of 
"mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect. . . . " 
In the instant case, respondent was admittedly aware of the 
date on which her Motion for Review was due. Her subsequent 
failure to timely file the Motion, therefore, fails to meet the 
basic requirements of the rule, thus rendering relief under it 
inappropriate. 
Finally, appellants allege that the untimely filing 
of a Motion for Review is a defect of jurisdictional magnitude 
which cannot be waived by the Commission anymore than the late 
filing of an appeal may be waived by this Court under Rule 3(a) 
of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. This position is 
supported by the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Griffith v. 
Industrial Commission, 16 Ut.2d 264, 399 P.2d 204 (1965). In 
Griffith, the applicant's Petition for Rehearing was denied 
by the Commission as being untimely made. On appeal, the 
Supreme Court reversed, noting that the applicant's Petition 
was timely filed when the three days allowed for mailing were 
taken into account. It then stated: 
. . . [R]ealizing that the last day of 
the 3 0-day period allowed by Section 
35-1-82, U.C.A. 1953 fell on February 22, a 
state holiday, the plaintiff's petition for 
rehearing was timely filed; and therefore, 
this court has jurisdiction for review 
under Section 35-1-82, U.C.A. 1953 
requiring for preservation of the right to 
judicial review a timely request for 
rehearing on the Commission's decision. 
(Footnote omitted.) 
Id. at 206. Since the record reflects a late filing by the 
respondent, the Commission had no jurisdiction to entertain her 
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Motion for Review and its Order granting the same should be 
vacated. 
CONCLUSION 
The Commission had no jurisdiction to enter its Order 
Granting Motion for Review since Ms. Lamoreaux1s Motion for 
Review was not timely filed. The failure to timely file a 
motion for review is a failure of jurisdictional magnitude. 
Therefore, the Commission's Order should be vacated and the 
decision of the Administrative Law Judge should be reinstated 
and affirmed. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the [Commission's Order was 
properly entered, the record below does not substantiate to any 
degree the Industrial Commission's claim that Ms. Lamoreaux's 
job at Varian - Eimac was the sole cauqe of her preexisting 
back problems. Moreover, the law does |not require a 
preexisting problem to be non-industrial before the higher 
for purposes of 
bedical evidence of 
standard of legal causation is invoked 
determining compensability. Since the 
record indicates Ms. Lamoreaux was suffering from arthritis in 
her back and had sought medical treatment for her back on 
several prior occasions for injuries occurring both at work and 
at home, and because the medical panel report clearly states 
Ms. Lamoreaux was suffering from a preexisting condition at the 
time of her injury, her claim for benefits must necessarily be 
denied for failure to meet the higher standard of legal 
causation under Allen. Accordingly, the Administrative Law 
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Judge's ruling was correct and it should be reinstated by this 
Court. 
DATED this J/H day of ^  
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s m Prfeoy / 1988. 
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Attorneys for Petitioners 
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320 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
JR. 
& CALL, P.C, 
84102 
Erie V. Boorman, Administrator 
SECOND INJURY FUND 
P.O. Box 510250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0250 
OF UTAH INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION! 
160 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 510250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0250 
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C. RICHARD HENRIKSEN, JR. #1466 
of HENRIKSEN, HENRIKSEN & CALL, P.C. 
320 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 






INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
CASE No. 860001 
/ 
55 
HELEN D. LAMOREAUX, 
Applicant, 
VARIAN-EIMAC, INC., AND/OR 
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL LIABILITY 










MOTION FOR REVIEW OF FINDINGS 
OF F ACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
W ORDER 
h h i * A t * * A \ I t h I A 
COMES NOW Helen D. Lamoreaux, by and through her 
attorney, C. Richard Henriksen, Jr., 
Henriksen, & Call, P.C. and moves that 
of the firm of Henriksen, 
fthe Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order of the Honbrable Administrative Law 
by the Indistrial 
:^he following particular 
Judge, Gilbert A. Martinez, be reviewed] 
Commission. Such motion is based upon 
errors and objections: 
1. That the Findings of Fact do not include the fact 
that the Bl-90 centers were lifted six to ten times each, six 
centers per day for between 40 and 60 times per day, which is not 
what an average person does in normal, every day life. 
2. Prior to the time that Helen Lamoreaux began work 
for Varian-Eimac, Inc., she had no pre-existing injury 
whatsoever. That the treatments in April and in Auqust of 1985 
were directly related to her employment, and in particular, to 
torquing and lifting on the job. 
3. The Findings of Fact do not include a finding that 
the automobile collision the applicant sustained when she was 
approximately 17 years of age did not result in a long-term 
injury, except for some minor pain to her back, which went away 
after a short time. 
4. As of February, 1980 when the claimant, Helen 
Lamoreaux, went to work for Varian-Eimac, Inc., she had no pre-
existing injuries whatsover. 
5. That the Administrative Law Judge has misapplied 
the laws of the state of Utah, and in particular, the Allen vs. 
Industrial Commission 46 Utah A.R.3 (Utah 1986). When that case is 
applied since Helen lifted Bl-90's 40 to 60 times per day which 
weigh approximately 18 1/2 lbs., which is not an average person 
would normally do in an average day, compensation should be 
awarded. Also Helen's case is distinguishable from the Allen case, 
in that case, the claimant had sustained three separate, 
identifiable, pre-existing injuries prior to employment with the 
employer. In this case, any pre-existing problems were caused by 
working with this employer and Helen did not bring with her to the 
work place, with a condition that increased her risk of injury, buy 
all of the increase and risk of injury was contributed to and caused 
by her employment. When the legal causation test of the Allen 
decision is used, the question is whether the employee came to the worl 
place with a condition that increased the risk of injury, and then i 
important to consider a worker who comes to work for the employer 
without any increased risk of injury, and because of the work that 
the employee is required to perform, causes a failure. In the 
opinion of the Administrative Law JudgeL the claimant would be 
compensible under a long line of decisions prior to Allen. This 
case is distinguishable from the Allen case. The claimant did not 
bring to the work place a personal increase in the risk of injury 
and compensation should be awarded. This is a case very similar to 
the case of Kaiser Steel Corporation vsl Monfredi 631 p.2d 888 
(Utah 1981) wherein Monfredi, the applicant who had a History of 
back problems, was awarded compensation|because of a climax due to 
exertion, stress and other repetitive cAuses at his work place. 
Also see Schmidt vs. Industrial Commission of Utah 617 p.2d 693. 
DATED this 17th day of February, 1987. 
Richafrfl Henr^tsbn, Jr, 
Attorney for Applicant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Helen D. Lamoreaux 
5541 South 2775 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84118 
Employers Mutual Liability 
P.O. Box 7400 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Attn: Dick Sagura 
Michael E. Dyer 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Erie V. Boorman, Admilm' sf-r^ i-or 
Second Injury Fund 
tlnlsi 
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